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Crisis management and warning
procedures
Actors and their roles in the case of flooding risks in Switzerland
Valérie November, Reynald Delaloye and Marion Penelas
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translation: Brian Keogh
1 Two cases of flooding that mainly affected new residential districts built on land liable to
flooding (Saillon,  Valais canton, 2000;  Lully,  Genève canton, 2002) were analysed in a
study  conducted  within  the  framework  of  COST  Action  C19  “Vulnérabilité  des
infrastructures  urbaines  et  gestion  de  crise:  impacts  et  enseignements  de  cas
d’inondation en Suisse” (Vulnerability of urban infrastructure and crisis management:
impacts  and lessons from flooding in Switzerland)  (November,  Reynard (dir.),  2006)1.
During  this  study2,  prevention  and  warning  procedures  were  keywords  that  were
constantly evoked by interviewees. 
2 Managing risks  involves  perfecting monitoring methods  capable  of  providing precise
information on the situation to be managed, so that managers can decide how best to
intervene. In the case of a crisis, this implies that information can be transferred in an
optimum manner. However, it may happen that the information transfer chain breaks
down when the situation becomes complicated, particularly when the magnitude of the
event and the way it occurs do not correspond to the formalisation of the risk held by the
actors  involved  in  its  management.  Given  the  diversity  of  actors  concerned,  the
multiplicity  of  decision  levels  (individual,  communal,  regional,  national,  and  even
international), the fact that a state of readiness tends to become toned down with time,
and that land uses are subject to change, decisions taken during a given risk situation
may prove  to  be  untimely  and to  lack  coherence.  Our  study  therefore  explored  the
different ways in which prevention and emergency procedures were organised, firstly in
a general and theoretical manner, then on the basis of individual cases by identifying the
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actors  involved  in  these  procedures  and  the  ways  in  which  the  procedures  were
reorganised following a crisis. 
 
Alert procedures and crisis management: towards a
theoretical framework 
3 A risk may be defined as a potential event that has not yet happened but which it is felt
will result in a disastrous event (a crisis) for individuals or for a community in a given
space or spaces (November, 2002). This definition is deliberately broad. It differs from
that proposed in natural and economic sciences where risk quantitatively designates,
within a given sector, the economic consequences (including loss in human lives) that an
uncertain  event  could  lead  to  if  it  actually  occurred,  the  uncertain  event  being  an
instability or a process recognised spatially and qualified by a degree of danger.  Our
definition is, however, very close to that adopted by Callon et al. (2001: 37) for whom risk
is “[…] a clearly identified danger associated with the occurrence of an event or series of
events, which are perfectly describable, events that we do not know will take place but
that we know are capable of taking place” (translation). 
4 Risks  comprise  several  stages,  from their  identification  (which  assumes  interpreting
warning  signs  and  conducting  diagnoses,  defining  criteria  and  indicators)  to  their
management  (implementation  of  risk  minimisation  measures)  and  their  possible
manifestation (catastrophe or gradual reduction of risk, post-crisis management). These
stages translate into both actions, involving a multitude of actors, and a process: a secure
zone may become a risk zone following deterioration of protective structures, climatic
changes  or  a  transfer  of  risks  caused  by  projects  undertaken  elsewhere  whose
implementation has caused cumulative effects over time that have resulted in problems
(for example, increasing impermeability of soils). 
5 In line with this perspective, emergency alerts appear as “real tests of the monitoring and
crisis  management measures already in place and,  at the same time,  bring into play
methods  of  interaction  between  the  local  and  the  global,  the  individual  and  the
communal, the profane and the expert, the subjective and the objective” (translation)
(Chateauraynaud, Torny, 1999: 15). As these two authors demonstrate, a crisis alert is
based on monitoring, surveillance and attention and involves activation of a memory,
whether the alert is in response to a phenomenon that is unfolding or to a possibility, or
whether  it  is  a  response to  an imminent  catastrophe or  the  evaluation of  a  poorly-
understood or underestimated risk. Thus, the alert is not only a question of techniques,
sensors or alarms, but also the result of a process that creates a network of actors and
cooperation among institutional and non-institutional authorities. “The alert takes the
form of an approach, personal or collective, aimed at mobilising authorities considered to
be capable of  acting and,  at  the very least,  of  informing the public  of  a  danger,  the
imminence of a catastrophe, or the uncertain character of a company or technological
choice” (translation) (Chateauraynaud, Torny, 1999: 37). From this viewpoint, the alert is
to be considered as "a capture of information". Furthermore, the alert helps redefine the
territory in both an anthropological and administrative sense. This theoretical proposal is
in  line  with a  perspective  of  the sociology of  science and techniques  and pragmatic
sociology which focuses analysis on the processes in progress, and the configurations and
reconfigurations of the action underway.  Few authors have analysed the problems of
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flooding along these lines, with the notable exception, however, of the work conducted by
Le Bourhis and Bayet (2002). 
 
Context of the two crises 
6 Saillon is a small alpine town undergoing development, where the new residential areas
are situated on the flood plain of the Rhone, while Lully is in the rurban (residential) zone
of the Geneva countryside. In both communities, the majority of inhabitants affected by
the floods – which only caused material damage – had never experienced flooding before,
but there are, however, several aspects that differentiate the two situations. Firstly, at a
political level, the involvement of the administrative entities (cantons, communes) in the
prevention and management  of  natural  hazards,  at  least  at  the beginning of  events,
differs. Motivated by recurring critical situations (floods of 1987 and 1993, avalanches of
1999), the Valais Canton had taken measures that, in 2000, helped prepare it to face a
major crisis affecting several sites simultaneously. On the other hand, at the level of the
commune, the state of readiness and risk awareness are often less developed, particularly
when the area (and this was the case for Saillon) has not been affected recently by an
event of this type.  In Geneva,  the existence of hazard maps and the inclusion of the
notion of natural hazards in the cantonal Master Plan had not resulted until 2002 in a
factual  and  immediate  consideration  of  the  risks  threatening  Lully,  either  by  the
commune or the canton. 
7 Next, the hydrological context is also different (deferment of flooding following a breach
in the dyke in Saillon, concentration and insufficient evacuation of run-off in Lully). 
8 The magnitude of the crises also differed in the two locations. Almost the entire Valais
canton had suffered the consequences of  very heavy rainfall  for more than 24 hours
(breaches  in  dykes,  overflows,  mudflows,  landslides),  while  in  Lully  the  event  was
isolated. Finally, the two areas differed with respect to the recurrence of flooding: similar
situations had occurred several times in the recent past in Lully, the last time being in
2001, while in Saillon, the last time the alluvial plain was flooded by the Rhone was more
than 50 years ago. 
 
The Saillon flood of 2000 
9 The urban development of the floodplain area of Saillon began in the 1980s. The land use
plan  for  the  commune,  dating  from 1991,  does  not  include  hazard  zones  related  to
flooding. However, several sources of possible flooding were identified before the event of
2000: 
10 (1) the overflow of the Rhone whose first bottomland is several metres above the level of
the  plain,  (2)  a  lateral  tributary  crossing  the  plain  upstream  of  Saillon,  (3)  karstic
exsurgence downstream of the area of Saillon, (4) rise in groundwater to surface level in
the lowest points in the plain, to which was added (5) the risk of a breach in one or other
of the major alpine hydro electrical power dams. But the origin of the flood in 2000 was
elsewhere. 
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The crisis 
11 Heavy rain affected the southern part of  the Valais canton from 12 October 2000.  In
certain cases, river flow rates, like the rainfall in the most affected areas, reached levels
corresponding to return times of  more than 1000 years (BWG, 2000).  As early as the
morning of October 15, the firemen in Saillon were monitoring the Rhone following an
alert issued by the headquarters of the CECA (Disaster Unit of Valais canton). A breach in
the dyke occurred around at 1.30 pm, a few kilometres upstream (Figure 1). In Saillon, the
river flow rate decreased by about 20%. The Rhone plain has been naturally divided up by
the lateral tributaries of the river and their alluvial cones. However, the drainage canals
pass under these tributaries and weaken the sections. Thus it was via these canals that
the flood of 2000 crossed two sections before reaching that of Saillon seven hours later
(Figure 1). Because of a lack of communication at the cantonal level, the little town of
Saillon was not officially informed of the breach in the dyke. When the firemen still on
duty noticed the flooding of the preceding section in the early evening, it was then too
late to take preventive measures. As the Saillon plain became flooded by the overflow
from the drainage canal, the firemen evacuated the zones affected. Cellars and even the
inhabitable parts of numerous buildings were invaded by the water. 
 
Figure 1. Flooding of the Rhone plain in the three successive sections of Ardon-Chamoson, Leytron
and Saillon. The triangles represent the breach points firstly in the Rhone dyke in the first section,
then in the Leytron section of the dyke for the Sion-Riddes canal. This canal, near the Rhone,
evacuates water from the Ardon-Chamoson section. The Saillon flood plain is then flooded by the
overflow from a second canal that drains water from the Leytron section. 
OFEG, 2002, modiﬁed.
12 While the Valais canton has several measures, such as a law concerning organisation in
the event of a catastrophe, and authorities for managing a flood event (CECA, CERISE
(Crisis scientific unit) etc.), the town of Saillon has no coordinating body. To organise
emergency teams (firemen, disaster and emergency services), the town creates a local
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crisis control centre as and when required. The management of information flows to the
local population and the lack of personnel were among the main difficulties the town had
to face during the floods. 
 
Reorganisation 
13 Difficulties and operational problems during the event resulted in a certain number of
measures  being introduced at  both the  canton and the  town level.  Thus  the  canton
defined  responsibilities  and  information  flows  by  preparing  a  Rhone  emergency
intervention plan. In addition, it created the Section organisation, planification et prévention
en cas de catastrophes (Department in charge of organisation, planning and prevention in the
event of catastrophes) which is now responsible for advising communes and for training
local crisis control centres. The town of Saillon has identified the lessons to be learned
from the flood, particularly with regard to preparations for future catastrophes and flood
protection measures. It has set up a local crisis control centre and introduced regulations
for organising the commune in the event of  disasters or extraordinary situations.  In
addition,  it  has  prepared  plans  to  provide  for  protection  against  flooding  and
renaturation of the rivers affecting the commune. 
 
Lully flood of 2002 
14 The second flood studied occurred in the lower part of the village of Lully (Bas-Lully) in
the commune of Bernex. Three sources of vulnerability had been identified in the flood
plan. Until 2002, the main threat was considered to be the neighbouring river, the Aire,
whose banks rise above the average level of the recent residential sector of Bas Lully.
However, this sector is located at the outlet from a sub-catchment area of the Aire, which
today is without a natural drain, and corresponds to the zone where runoff accumulates,
runoff which has difficulty in draining away when the Aire is in flood (Figure 2). Finally,
the last hazard comes from the relatively high level of the surface aquifer in the flood
plain of the Aire, which at this point is above the bed of the river. It is the runoff that led
to the flood of 2002. 
 
Crisis management and warning procedures
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 95-2 | 2007
5
Figure 2. The Lully flood: location map. (a) indicates the position of the outlet in the Aire of the
main drain from the Lully plain. 
CSD/HydroGéo, 2002.
 
First signs of the crisis 
15 The lower part of Lully was designated for building in 1954 and underwent a certain
amount of development from the 1970s onwards. The development plan adopted in 1982
mentioned  a  flood  risk,  without  specifying  its  nature  or  how it  might  be  protected
against. The only flood threat taken seriously by the authorities was that posed by the
Aire, a danger made more tangible by the publication in 2000 of a map of flooding risks on
this river.  In 2001,  two residential  blocks were built,  each equipped with inhabitable
basements, despite the fact that the use of basements for residential purposes had been
prohibited by cantonal law (Tanquerel, 2003). In March 2001, the excavation works were
inundated by runoff waters. This event led to the construction of a new main sewer for
clear water, completed too late, however, to avoid further flooding in 2002. 
16 At that time, no Genevan government department was really responsible for dealing with
runoff waters.  Furthermore, applications for building permits were not systematically
transmitted to the services competent to identify this risk. In addition, the recent map of
flooding risks on the Aire had not yet been integrated in planning and development
procedures. 
 
Management of the crisis 
17 The floods of 2002 were due to heavy precipitation (> 90 mm) which occurred in two
episodes, first during the day of 14 November, then in the night of the 14 to 15 November.
The  return  time  of  this  precipitation  was  about  120  years  (MétéoSuisse  /  Swiss
Meteorological  Office).  The  water  intercepted  by  the  drains  in  the  agricultural  zone
upstream could not be correctly evacuated: the drainage network and its main sewer
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became saturated and their outlet was blocked by the Aire in flood. Thus runoff flowed
along  the  surface  and  reached  Bas-Lully  (lower  part  of  the  town)  on  15  November
between 3 and 4 o’clock in the morning, surprising many residents in their sleep (Figure
2). 
18 The alert threshold was fixed by MétéoSuisse at 50 mm of rainfall in 12 hours, a threshold
that was not reached in the first episode. Estimating that the second episode was not
going to affect Geneva, MeteoSuisse gave no warning. In Lully,  despite firemen being
present in the afternoon of the 14 November, and even a short time before the flood, the
residents were neither alerted, nor evacuated. The emergency services present did not
expect an event of such intensity. Some residents who were sleeping on the lower floor
(basement section) of their homes were surprised by a flood of water that entered as the
basement windows, installed in ditches to allow light into the lower floors, broke. The
basements of the recent constructions were completely flooded. 
 
“Redeployment” of emergency actors 
19 Given that the area affected was limited in extent, the difficulties encountered during the
event concerned more the forecasting of the crisis than its management. Thus, after the
event, the chief fireman of the city of Geneva observed that it was better to exaggerate
the means employed to intervene, than to under-estimate the risk. It would be better in
the future to apply a sort of principle of precaution in emergencies. 
20 The aim of the “Cellule d’intempéries pour Genève” or CIGE (Bad Weather Unit), set up by
the cantonal authorities in December 2004, is to interpret the forecasts of MétéoSuisse
during critical weather conditions. The unit includes representatives of both the disaster
and emergency services and the cantonal services. Following the event, the regional alert
thresholds of MétéoSuisse were redefined: an accumulation of 50 mm in 24 hours was
fixed for the Alps and the northern Alps. It was reduced to 30 mm for the Lully sector. In
addition,  cantonal  authorities,  in  conjunction  with  the  fire  brigade,  prepared  a
cartographical index of water damage that had required the intervention of emergency
services. 
21 In the commune, a telephone answering machine was introduced. This uses three levels
of emergency to inform the local population, at any time, of the imminence of danger.
The Association Vivre à Lully (AVAL), created a few days after the flood of 2002, was set
up with the aim of ensuring better protection for the district. Enjoying the participation
of  the  majority  of  local  residents,  this  association  has  become  one  of  the  main
representatives  of  the  canton  regarding  safety  measures  for  the  village.  Groups  of
residents  regularly  practise  implementing  an  emergency  plan  at  the  scale  of  their
housing estate: in the event of danger, sliding panels will  be installed in front of the
houses to prevent water from entering. 
 
Alert conditions and the reorganisation of knowledge 
22 Despite the different contexts of the floods affecting Saillon and Lully, several common
points emerge from an analysis of the practices of the actors involved and the conditions
under which the existing monitoring and crisis management measures were put to the
test. 
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23 Flood  events  serve  a  purpose  in  that  they  provide  new  knowledge  (table  1).  The
knowledge of the majority of the actors interviewed was substantially increased. For most
residents, since neither the authorities of the canton or the commune were involved in
water  matters,  the  change  was  profound.  For  others,  such as  the  representatives  of
Genevan government departments concerned with water management,  it  was more a
question of updating or adapting already existing knowledge. Finally, only the knowledge
of a limited number of actors (farmers and market gardeners, representatives of cantonal
departments responsible for river engineering works) was confirmed by the events and
was only subject to a few modifications. Compared with the situation before the floods,
the state of knowledge of the different actors became more homogenous after the events.
In addition, recurrent flooding in the Valais area has confirmed the need to review river
management concepts – the Third Rhone correction project (Canton du Valais, 2000) – by
associating all expertise de facto related to the management of the same territorial entity.
 
Table 1. Four scenarios for modifications to knowledge.
November V., Reynard E. (dir.), 2006.
24 Our research also indicated that there is often information that is “pending” or "latent" ,
in other words information that has not yet been assigned to a precise legislative or
administrative framework. Such was the case with the hazard map for the Aire river,
which although official had not yet been integrated in the planning and development
procedures for the area. Certainly, the legitimacy of the hazard maps as a planning tool
was recognised in the Geneva Master plan issued in 2001, but the cantonal legislation was
still only at the project stage and its method of implementation was non-existent. The
publication of studies is thus often followed by a certain gestation period before such
studies are used for planning purposes. The occurrence of a disaster in fact accelerates
the process but does not necessarily result in its conclusion. It is here that the concept of
“prise” (Bessy, Chateauraynaud, 1995; Berque, 2000), based on the idea of "affordances"
introduced by the psychologist James J. Gibson (1977), helped us to illustrate this special
situation: several sources of information are available (affordances), but have not (yet)
been integrated (entered) in the institutional planning and prevention measures. 
25 In addition,  the flood helped to reassess the importance attributed to certain actors,
whether human or non-human. New alliances form and stabilise for a short time (Callon,
Law, 1997; November, 2002). The flood also resulted in more discerning evaluations of the
risks affecting the local area. What had been a familiar environment and living space was
henceforth  considered  as  a  potential  generator  of  risks.  This  aspect  has  also  been
mentioned  in  other  Swiss  and  European  studies  (Peltier,  2005;  Laganier  (ed.),  2006;
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Gruntfest, Handmer (ed.), 2001). Thus in Saillon this change in perception is encouraging
the commune to  protect  itself  against  other  types  of  risk  threatening the  commune
(landslides,  avalanches,  state  of  drinking  water  reservoir,  etc.).  Furthermore,  the
understanding of such risks makes it indispensable to reorganise prevention (planning)
and  management  (forecasts,  intervention)  aspects.  In  Lully,  cooperation  among  the
residents helped to set up an association that within a few weeks became a major voice in
defending their interests. In the same way, in the area of hydrological forecasts, the flood
confirmed the effectiveness of steps taken sufficiently early. More specifically, it is most
important to be able to anticipate the consequences of a rainfall event forecast at the
level of the catchment basin. Thus the challenge facing the CERISE and CIGE units is to
combine meteorological and hydrological knowledge so that the emergency services are
able to anticipate and plan their intervention more effectively. 
26 Warning conditions appear very similar in both these situations: the consequences of an
event have to be considered as major for one or a series of protection measures to be
undertaken. The consequences of the “first” event of 2001 in Lully were considered to be
too limited to  warrant  carrying out  more detailed investigations  when the area was
developed for housing – when in fact they would have undoubtedly helped to minimise
the affects of the flood in 2002. The monitoring and crisis management measures were
not changed in any way on this occasion. Thus the simple availability of knowledge of
hydrological  phenomena  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  protection  and  prevention
measures being taken. The risks must be identified as such and considered by the actors
to be relevant for them. 
 
Conclusions 
27 These case studies illustrate how a hazard alert puts existing crisis management and
monitoring measures to the test, and subsequently contributes to their reorganisation, at
least in part. 
28 Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates to what extent flood events act in a decisive
manner on the transformation of risk knowledge. Understanding and awareness of the
phenomenon is heightened in fact in every case, although to a lesser extent for those
actors who have already been confronted with similar events in the past. This is also the
case  for  knowledge  mobilised  by  the  flood.  This  may  exist  before  the  event  at
administrative levels,  without it  having been taken into consideration in institutional
procedures. Activation of such knowledge becomes accelerated following a catastrophe. 
29 Finally,  risks  and  crises  related  to  flooding  result  in  changes  to  local  policies  and
processes,  a  consequence of  the readjustments to local  networks of  actors.  However,
recollection of the risk fades with time, hence the need for it to be integrated in some
concrete form in the landscape. In this context, it has been shown that the setting up of
measures for crisis  management and the intervention of  emergency services is  often
more effective than the reorganisation of planning and development procedures, which
can only be deployed if the political will is there and over a relatively long period of time. 
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NOTES
1.  The research team comprised the authors of this article together with Emmanuel Reynard
(Université  de  Lausanne),  Louis  Boulianne  (CEAT-EPF  Lausanne),  Jean  Ruegg  (Université  de
Lausanne),  Marc  Zaugg  (Université  de  Zurich),  Luzius  Thomi  (Université  de  Lausanne)  and
Caroline Barbisch (EPF Lausanne).
2.  After consulting the necessary documents to gain a better understanding of the two cases,
almost forty indepth interviews were conducted with various actors concerned by the events.
Interviewees were contacted either because they were victims of the flooding or because they
were  professionally  involved  in  the  field  of  flooding  (planning  and  development,  rivers
department, etc.), whether it be at the level of prevention (disaster and emergency services, for
example) or action (professional firemen).  We conducted semi-directive interviews,  using the
same questions in both case studies. Interviews were recorded and transcribed.
ABSTRACTS
Based on two flood events that recently affected new housing areas in very different political,
organisational and hydrological contexts, this article examines the practices of actors involved in
emergency and crisis situations in Switzerland. In both cases, the actors are identified – through
their role and their position in the various procedures related to crisis management – and an
inventory  is  made  of  the  documents  used.  The  study  examines  how  the  flood  events  were
managed, identifies the organisational changes that followed the crises, and determines how the
risk was conceived and to what extent it was formalised by the different actors both before and
after the floods. Finally new forecasting and warning procedures that were set up following the
events are described. The study shows that floods have a decisive impact on the production of
knowledge, but that this phenomenon varies according to the actors. Events such as floods also
sometimes reveal the existence of "latent" knowledge, or knowledge that is available but has not
yet  been  integrated  into  institutional  procedures.  In  terms  of  both  forecasting  and  crisis
management,  these events  also provide the opportunity to  test  information channels  and to
identify  and  correct  any  problems  relating  to  organisation,  cooperation  or  the  reliability  of
means of communication. Among other things, the risks and crises related to flooding modify the
dynamics and policies of the local area as a result of readjustments in the networks of actors. The
introduction of emergency and crisis management measures appears more effective, however,
than the reorganisation of  planning and development procedures,  a  process  which generally
takes a lot longer. Nevertheless, since the recollection of events tends to fade with time, it is
important that risks find a more concrete form of spatial expression on the landscape. 
Sur  la  base  de  deux  événements  d’inondation  ayant  touché  récemment,  dans  des  contextes
politiques, organisationnels et hydrologiques bien différents, de nouveaux quartiers d’habitation,
cet article rend compte des pratiques des acteurs impliqués dans des situations d’alerte et de
crise en Suisse. Le recensement des acteurs – à travers leur rôle et leur place dans les mécanismes
de préparation, d’alerte et de gestion –, ainsi que l’inventaire des documents mobilisés par ceux-
ci, ont été réalisés dans les deux cas. Cette analyse a permis d’évaluer la gestion des événements,
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de déceler les changements organisationnels qui ont suivi les crises et de connaître la conception
et le degré de formalisation du risque dont étaient dotés les différents acteurs avant et après les
inondations. Plus encore, l’analyse a documenté les nouveaux processus d’alerte et de prévision
qui ont été mis en place suite aux événements.  Il  s’avère ainsi  que les épisodes d’inondation
agissent  de  façon décisive  sur  la  production de connaissances,  à  un degré  variable  selon les
acteurs. Ces épisodes révèlent aussi parfois l’existence de connaissances « en attente » qui ne
sont  pas  encore  intégrées  dans  les  procédures  institutionnelles.  Tant  du  point  de  vue  de  la
prévision que de la gestion de la crise, ils permettent aussi de tester les canaux de l’information
et de combler les déficits d’organisation, de collaboration et de sécurisation des dispositifs de
communication. En outre, les risques et les crises liés aux inondations modifient les dynamiques
et les politiques territoriales, conséquences du réajustement des réseaux d’acteurs. La mise en
place de dispositifs d’intervention et de gestion de crise se montre cependant plus efficace que la
refonte  des  dispositifs  d’aménagement,  généralement  longue.  Toutefois,  la  mémoire  des
événements se dégradant avec le temps, une inscription territoriale du risque s’avère nécessaire. 
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